發文單位：司法院
解釋字號：釋字第576號
解釋日期：民國93年4月23日
解釋爭點：人身保險適用複保險通知規定之判例違憲？
資料來源：
司法周刊 第 1182 期 1 版
司法院公報 第 46 卷 5 期 60-76 頁 
考選周刊 第 964 期 2 版
總統府公報 第 6579 號 43-76 頁
相關法條：
中華民國憲法 第 14、15、16、22、23、7、80 條 ( 36.01.01 )        
法院組織法 第 57 條 ( 90.05.23 )
行政法院組織法 第 16 條 ( 90.05.23 )
司法院大法官審理案件法 第 5 條 ( 82.02.03 )
保險法 第 35、36、37 條 ( 93.02.04 )

解釋文：
契約自由為個人自主發展與實現自我之重要機制，並為私法自治之基礎，除依契約之具體內容受憲法各相關基本權利規定保障外，亦屬憲法第二十二條所保障其他自由權利之一種。惟國家基於維護公益之必要，尚非不得以法律對之為合理之限制。
保險法第三十六條規定：﹁複保險，除另有約定外，要保人應將他保險人之名稱及保險金額通知各保險人。﹂第三十七條規定：﹁要保人故意不為前條之通知，或意圖 不當得利而為複保險者，其契約無效。﹂係基於損害填補原則，為防止被保險人不當得利、獲致超過其財產上損害之保險給付，以維護保險市場交易秩序、降低交易成本與健全保險制度之發展，而對複保險行為所為之合理限制，符合憲法第二十三條之規定，與憲法保障人民契約自由之本旨，並無牴觸。
人身保險契約，並非為填補被保險人之財產上損害，亦不生類如財產保險之保險金額是否超過保險標的價值之問題，自不受保險法關於複保險相關規定之限制。最高法 院七十六年台上字第一一六六號判例，將上開保險法有關複保險之規定適用於人身保險契約，對人民之契約自由，增加法律所無之限制，應不再援用。

理由書：
人民於其憲法上所保障之權利，遭受不法侵害，經依法定程序提起訴訟，對於確定終局裁判所適用之法律或命令發生有牴觸憲法之疑義，依司法院大法官審理案件法第五條第一項第二款規定聲請本院解釋憲法時，本院審查之對象，非僅以聲請書明指者為限，且包含該確定終局裁判援引為裁判基礎之法令，並與聲請人聲請釋憲之法令具有重要關聯者在內。最高法院七十六年台上字第一一六六號判例，經同院八十九年度台上字第二四九○號判決適用保險法第三十六條、第三十七條時一併援引為裁判基礎，其是否符合保險法上開規定之意旨，而發生牴觸憲法之疑義，亦應一併審理，合先敘明。
契約自由為個人自主發展與實現自我之重要機制，並為私法自治之基礎。契約自由，依其具體內容分別受憲法各相關基本權利規定保障，例如涉及財產處分之契約內 容，應為憲法第十五條所保障，又涉及人民組織結社之契約內容，則為憲法第十四條所保障；除此之外，契約自由亦屬憲法第二十二條所保障其他自由權利之一種。 惟國家基於維護公益之必要，尚非不得以法律對之為合理之限制。保險法第三十六條規定：﹁複保險，除另有約定外，要保人應將他保險人之名稱及保險金額通知各 保險人。﹂同法第三十七條規定：﹁要保人故意不為前條之通知，或意圖不當得利而為複保險者，其契約無效。﹂係基於損害填補原則，防止被保險人獲取超過損害 程度之不當利益，以維護保險市場交易秩序、降低交易成本、健全保險制度之發展並兼顧投保大眾權益，而對複保險行為所為之合理限制，符合憲法第二十三條之規 定，與憲法保障人民契約自由之本旨，並無牴觸。
人身保險並非以填補被保險人財產上之具體損害為目的，被保險人之生命、身體完整性既無法以金錢估計價值，自無從認定保險給付是否超額，僅得於締約時，事先約 定一定金額作為事故發生時給付之保險金額。故人身保險契約與填補財產上具體損害之財產保險契約有所不同，無不當得利之問題。是以保險法第三十六條、第三十七條之規定並不適用於人身保險契約。最高法院七十六年台上字第一一六六號判例謂：﹁所謂複保險，係指要保人對於同一保險利益，同一保險事故，與數保險人分 別訂立數個保險之契約行為而言，保險法第三十五條定有明文。依同法第三十六條規定，複保險除另有約定外，要保人應將他保險人之名稱及保險金額通知各保險人。準此，複保險之成立，應以要保人與數保險人分別訂立之數保險契約同時並存為必要。若要保人先後與二以上之保險人訂立保險契約，先行訂立之保險契約，即非複保險，因其保險契約成立時，尚未呈複保險之狀態。要保人嗣與他保險人訂立保險契約，故意不將先行所訂保險契約之事實通知後一保險契約之保險人，依保險 法第三十七條規定，後一保險契約應屬無效，非謂成立在先之保險契約亦屬無效。﹂雖未明確指出複保險之適用範圍，惟上開判例係涉及締結複數人身保險契約之爭議，而認保險法第三十六條、第三十七條有關複保險之規定應適用於人身保險契約，已對人民受憲法保障之契約自由，增加保險法第三十六條、第三十七條所無之限 制，應自本解釋公布之日起，不再援用。
至於聲請人主張前開確定終局判決所適用之保險法第三十六條、第三十七條有牴觸憲法第七條之疑義一節，經查系爭法律無論於文義上或適用上均未涉及差別待遇，不生違反平等權之問題，併此敘明。
本件聲請人認本案確定終局判決與最高法院其他判決所表示之見解有異，而聲請統一解釋部分，核其所陳，係屬同一審判機關內裁判見解所生之歧異，並非不同審判機 關間之確定終局裁判適用同一法律或命令所表示之見解有異，核與司法院大法官審理案件法第七條第一項第二款之要件不符，依同條第三項規定，應不受理。


J. Y. Interpretation No.   576
Date： 2004.4.23
Issue：Does the restriction on multiple insurance adopted from the Supreme Court Precedent apply to personal insurance under Articles 36 and 37 of the Insurance Act?
Holding：
Freedom of contract is an essential mechanism for individual self-development and self-accomplishment. It is also the basis for self-government under the private law. In addition to the material content of the contract being protected by the Constitution under related provisions of fundamental rights, freedom of contract is also one of the liberties preserved under Article 22 of the Constitution. Only when it is necessary to defend public interests may such a right be reasonably restricted under the law.

　　Article 36 of the Insurance Act states that: “The insurant of multiple insurance shall inform each insurer the names of and the amount insured under other insurers, unless specified otherwise.” Article 37 stipulates that: “The insurance agreement shall be void if the insurant purposely fails to inform or intentionally obtains multiple insurance for unjust enrichment.” The principle of compensation for actual damages prevents the insured from unjust enrichment and obtaining insurance payments exceeding the value of property damages. Moreover, to maintain the trade order of the insurance market, lower transaction costs, and protect the development of the insurance system, reasonable restriction on multiple insurance in compliance with Article 23 of the Constitution does not conflict with the fundamental right of freedom of contract.

　　The coverage for personal insurance (personal insurance includes, but is not limited to, health, life, and accident insurances) neither provides remedy for the property damages of the insured, nor does the insured amount exceed the value insured as in property insurance; therefore, the restriction on multiple insurance under the Insurance Act is not applicable. The Supreme Court Precedent T.S.T. No. 1166, which adopted the above restriction on multiple insurance on personal insurance agreements, should no longer be valid due to its burden on the people’s freedom of contract.

Reasoning：
When the people’s protected constitutional rights are violated, they may pursue litigation following legal procedures. If the petitioner has questions on the constitutionality of the statute or regulation relied thereupon by the court of last resort in its final judgment, the petitioner may request interpretation by the Judicial Yuan according to Article 5, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2, of the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act. The interpretation of the subject matter evaluated is not limited to that specified in the petition, but may include the laws and orders adopted to reach the final verdict and those closely related requested for interpretation in the petition. The Supreme Court Precedent T.S.T. No. 1166 (Supreme Court, 1987) and Articles 36 and 37 of the Insurance Act have been adopted as bases for ruling by the same court in T.S.T. No. 2490 (2000). Whether this decision coincides with the principle of the Insurance Act and conflicts with the Constitution shall be addressed below.

　　Freedom of contract is an essential mechanism for individual self-development and self-accomplishment, and the basis for self-government under private law. Depending on the actual content of the contract, freedom of contract is protected by the Constitution under related provisions of fundamental rights. For example, a contract for property disposal is protected by Article 15 of the Constitution; a contract regarding the association of people is protected by Article 14. In addition, the freedom of contract is one of the liberties preserved under Article 22 of the Constitution. Only when it is necessary to defend public interests may such a freedom be reasonably restricted under the law. Article 36 of the Insurance Act provides: “The insurant of multiple insurance shall inform each insurer of the names of and the amount insured under other insurers, unless specified otherwise.” Article 37 states: “The insurance agreement shall be void if the insurant purposely fails to inform or intentionally obtains multiple insurance for unjust enrichment.” The principle of compensation for actual damages prevents the insured from unjust enrichment and obtaining insurance payments exceeding the value of property damages. Moreover, to maintain the trade order of the insurance market, lower transaction costs, protect the development of the insurance system, and defend the rights of the insured public, reasonable restriction on multiple insurance in compliance with Article 23 of the Constitution does not conflict with the fundamental right of freedom of contract.

　　 Providing remedy for the actual property damage of the insured is not the main purpose of personal insurance. Since the life and physical integrality of the insured cannot be monetarily quantified, there is no objective standard by which to determine whether the insurance payment is overcompensating. The parties of the contract can merely agree upon a fixed amount of insurance payment when an accident occurs. Unlike property insurance that compensates for actual damages, personal insurance does not cause unjust enrichment. Hence, Articles 36 and 37 of the Insurance Act do not apply to personal insurance policies. The Supreme Court Precedent T.S.T. No. 1166 holds: “Article 35 of the Insurance Act states that when the insurant enters into several insurance agreements with several insurers for the same insured interest or insured accident, it is called ‘multiple insurance.’ According to Article 36 of the same Act, the insurant of multiple insurance shall inform each insurer of the names of and the amount insured under other insurers, unless specified otherwise. Therefore, for the multiple insurance to be valid, the insurant shall simultaneously establish insurance agreements with each insurer individually. If the insurant enters into insurance agreements with more than two insurers, one after the other, the agreements do not yet constitute multiple insurance. If the insurant purposely fails to inform the latter insurer of the existence of the prior insurance agreement, according to Article 37 of the Insurance Act, the latter insurance agreement, rather than the former one, shall be void.” Although the scope of application of multiple insurance is not expressly specified, the above Precedent relates to a dispute arising from multiple personal insurance, applying Articles 36 and 37, of the Insurance Act, relating multiple insurance to personal insurance policies. For the protection of freedom of contract, the Precedent enforces restrictions not included in the two provisions, thus, it shall cease to be effective from the declaration date of this interpretation.

　　As to the petitioner’s assertion that Articles 36 and 37 of the Insurance Act adopted to reach the above final verdict conflict with Article 7 of the Constitution, it should be noted that the subject provisions did not result in discrimination or violation of equal rights. The petitioner requested a unified interpretation due to the difference between the above final verdict and other verdicts of the Supreme Court. The difference was among the opinions in reaching the final verdict in the same court, rather than among different courts applying identical laws or orders in reaching the final verdict. This does not coincide with Article 7 Paragraph 1 Subparagraph 2 of the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act. Accordingly, the petition should be denied based on Paragraph 3 of the same Article.

' Translated by Wei-Feng Huang of THY Taiwan International Law Offices.